CVE-2026-110486 Security Alert: CRITICAL Vulnerability
Urgent: CVE-2026-110486 requires immediate attention.
· 7 min read
Executive Summary
CVE-2026-110486 is a critical remote code execution issue in Eclipse Mosquitto 2.1 through 2.1.2 when a listener is configured with protocol websockets. A malformed empty WebSocket data frame can make the broker read uninitialized heap memory and then write past the end of an allocation. The bug is reachable before authentication, so allow_anonymous false does not protect you. A remote client that can connect to the broker may be able to crash it, leak heap/libc pointers, and potentially gain code execution as the Mosquitto service user.
Action now: if you run Mosquitto with WebSockets enabled, treat this as an emergency patch-and-restart event. If you cannot patch immediately, disable the WebSocket listener or isolate the broker from untrusted networks.
Immediate Action
- Upgrade immediately to the first fixed Mosquitto release from the vendor advisory. TODO: replace with the exact fixed version once confirmed by Eclipse.
- Disable WebSockets on any listener that does not strictly need it. Remove or comment out
protocol websocketsinmosquitto.conf. - Restrict network exposure to trusted IPs only. Put the broker behind a firewall, VPN, or reverse proxy with allowlists.
- Restart the broker after patching and verify the active binary is the new version, not just the package metadata.
- Watch for crashes or odd memory errors in broker logs; treat repeated disconnects or segfaults as possible exploitation attempts.
- Vendor advisory: Eclipse Mosquitto security advisory for CVE-2026-110486
Affected Versions
eclipse-mosquitto@2.1.0vulnerableeclipse-mosquitto@2.1.1vulnerableeclipse-mosquitto@2.1.2vulnerable- Safe:
eclipse-mosquitto@TODO_FIXED_VERSION+(use the first vendor-patched release) - Condition for exposure: a listener configured with
protocol websockets
Resolution Guide
Important: Mosquitto is usually installed as a system package or container image, not as an npm/pip/Maven dependency. The commands below focus on the common deployment paths.
# Debian/Ubuntu
sudo apt update
sudo apt install --only-upgrade mosquitto
sudo systemctl restart mosquitto
# RHEL/CentOS/Fedora
sudo yum update mosquitto
# or
sudo dnf upgrade mosquitto
sudo systemctl restart mosquitto
# Verify installed version
mosquitto -v 2>&1 | head -n 1
mosquitto -h 2>&1 | head -n 1
# Docker: pull the fixed tag once published
docker pull eclipse-mosquitto:TODO_FIXED_VERSION
docker stop mosquitto
docker rm mosquitto
docker run -d --name mosquitto \
-p 1883:1883 -p 9001:9001 \
-v "$PWD/mosquitto.conf:/mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf" \
eclipse-mosquitto:TODO_FIXED_VERSION
# If you manage Mosquitto in a container orchestrator, update the image tag
# and redeploy the workload.
kubectl set image deployment/mosquitto mosquitto=eclipse-mosquitto:TODO_FIXED_VERSION
kubectl rollout status deployment/mosquitto
Config hardening:
# mosquitto.conf
# Disable WebSockets unless absolutely required
# listener 9001
# protocol websockets
# Keep MQTT only on trusted networks
listener 1883
allow_anonymous false
If you must keep WebSockets enabled temporarily: place the broker behind a reverse proxy that only allows trusted clients, and block direct access to the WebSocket port at the firewall.
Minimal code/config mitigation example: if your deployment template enables WebSockets by default, gate it behind a feature flag and turn it off until the patched release is deployed.
# Example feature flag in your deployment config
ENABLE_MQTT_WEBSOCKETS=false
Detection & Verification
Check whether you are vulnerable:
# Find WebSocket listeners in config
grep -RniE 'protocol[[:space:]]+websockets|listener|websocket' /etc/mosquitto /usr/local/etc/mosquitto 2>/dev/null
# Check package version on Debian/Ubuntu
dpkg -l | grep mosquitto
# Check package version on RHEL/Fedora
rpm -qa | grep mosquitto
# Check the running binary version
mosquitto -v 2>&1 | head -n 1
# If using containers
docker images | grep mosquitto
docker inspect eclipse-mosquitto:TODO_FIXED_VERSION | grep -i version
Dependency and image checks:
# Debian/Ubuntu security status
apt-cache policy mosquitto
# RHEL family
yum info mosquitto
dnf info mosquitto
# Container scan examples
trivy image eclipse-mosquitto:TODO_FIXED_VERSION
grype eclipse-mosquitto:TODO_FIXED_VERSION
Verify the fix:
# Confirm the patched version is installed and running
mosquitto -v 2>&1 | head -n 1
# Confirm no WebSocket listener remains unless intentionally enabled
grep -Rni 'protocol[[:space:]]\+websockets' /etc/mosquitto
# Confirm the service restarted cleanly
sudo systemctl status mosquitto --no-pager
journalctl -u mosquitto -n 50 --no-pager
Risk and Impact
This bug can be triggered remotely by a client that can open a session to the broker, and the vulnerable path is reachable before authentication. The likely outcomes are information disclosure from uninitialized heap memory, broker crash, and in the worst case remote code execution as the Mosquitto service account. For solo developers and small teams, the blast radius is often the entire messaging layer: device telemetry, internal events, and any downstream automation that depends on the broker.
If you run Mosquitto on a public IP, assume it is a priority target and patch or isolate it immediately.